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As a firm deviates from its target leverage from above (below), the bankruptcy costs 
(foregone tax savings) rise at an increasing rate while the tax savings (reduced bankruptcy costs) 
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phenomenon renders the speed of adjustment (SOA) an increasing function of the deviation. 
Employing a bootstrapping-based estimation strategy that averts well-known estimation biases, 
we find U.S. firms exhibit a positive SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation. Also, the SOA 
sensitivity is greater for overlevered than underlevered firms. 
Keywords: capital structure, speed of adjustment, adjustment costs, heterogeneity, 
bootstrapping 
JEL Classification: G32  
∗Corresponding author: University of New Orleans, 2000 Lakeshore Dr, New Orleans, LA 70148; Phone: 
(504) 280-7146; Fax: (504) 280-6397; E-mail: tmukherj@uno.edu. 
Our paper has greatly benefited from the valuable comments and suggestions of Ivo Welch, Peter Iliev, 
Bonnie Van Ness (the editor), and two anonymous reviewers. We also thank discussants and seminar 
participants at the 2012 Southwestern Finance Association conference—“Best Paper in Corporate Finance” 
(New Orleans), the 2012 Midwest Finance Association 2012 Conference (New Orleans), the 2012 Financial 
Management Association Asian conference (Phuket, Thailand), and the 2012 Financial Management 
Association conference (Atlanta) for their comments. All errors are ours. 
597 
598 
1. Introduction 
According to the tradeoff theory, capital structure decisions involve considera­
tions of a tradeoff primarily between debt-incurred tax shield and bankruptcy costs. 
A firm’s optimal (target) capital structure is where the marginal tax shield from lever­
age equals its marginal bankruptcy costs, and a deviation from the target represents 
a loss in firm value. In the presence of costs associated with security issuance and 
repurchase, however, a firm will act to eliminate the deviation if and when the net ben­
efit of adjustment is greater than the costs (e.g., Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner, 1989; 
Strebulaev, 2007). Thus, adjustment costs could hold back a firm from rebalancing its 
capital structure, as evidenced by the preponderance of empirical evidence showing 
on average a slow adjustment process.1 Since potential for cross-firm differences in 
adjustment costs and benefits exists, heterogeneous SOAs are likely results. 
A small but growing strand of the capital structure literature examines the effect 
of adjustment costs on a firm’s SOA. They typically instrument adjustment costs 
with certain firm characteristics like firm size and report a negative relation between 
adjustment costs and SOA. For example, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) show that larger 
firms adjust faster than small ones. Byoun (2008) finds overlevered (underlevered) 
firms rebalance more actively when they are faced with a financial surplus (deficit). 
A potential explanation, albeit not explicitly made in his paper due to its focus, is 
that the financial surplus saves the firm a special trip to the capital market and hence 
lowers the costs of reducing leverage. Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins and Smith 
(2012) (hereafter referred to as FFHS 2012) extend this probe to argue that large cash 
flow realizations will lower leverage adjustment costs and induce faster adjustments. 
Empirically, they find a positive relation between the magnitude of cash flows and 
SOA. Lockhart (2010) shows that access to credit lines is associated with notably 
faster SOA, again due to the lower adjustment costs. Oztekin and Flannery (2012) 
conduct a cross-country study to confirm the link between SOAs and proxies of 
adjustment costs. 
Our paper differs from the literature discussed above in that it emphasizes the 
linkage between adjustment benefit and adjustment speed. In particular, we posit 
that a firm’s SOA positively depends on the deviation from its target leverage. The 
rationale rests on the discrepant rates at which the tax shield and bankruptcy costs 
change as the leverage deviation increases. Abstracting from progressive tax rates, 
the expected tax shield is a concave function of the use of debt, increasing at a 
decelerating rate which eventually turns negative, as the likelihood of using the full 
extent of the tax shield offered by debt diminishes with leverage. In contrast, the 
1 The speed of adjustment (SOA) estimates range from 7% to 10% in Fama and French (2002) to 36% 
in Flannery and Rangan (2006), corresponding to half-lives of leverage deviation from 1.6 years to 9.6 
years. In the same vein, Leary and Roberts (2005) conclude that firms undo leverage shocks in a slow and 
intermittent fashion via equity and debt issuance activities. The partial adjustment phenomenon echoes 
the survey results of Graham and Harvey (2001) that most firms claim to have capital structure targets, but 
achieving the target is not always of prime urgency, and both are consistent with the tradeoff theory. 
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bankruptcy costs are generally known as increasing at an increasing rate as more debt 
is loaded. As a result, the firm value is a concave function of debt, as illustrated in the 
famous figure 1 in Myers (1984). Above (below) the target leverage, the bankruptcy 
costs rise (decline) at a faster (slower) speed than the tax benefits as the leverage 
further deviates, and hence, the benefit from adjusting the capital structure, or put it 
another way, the cost of not adjusting, increases with deviation, giving the manager 
greater incentives to move the leverage toward the target. 
In the presence of adjustment costs, rebalancing occurs only if the benefit of 
adjustment exceeds the costs. Thus, the shape of adjustment costs relative to the shape 
of adjustment benefit would determine when and how fast a firm adjusts. Leary and 
Roberts (2005) show that adjustment costs consist of a fixed element plus a weakly 
convex variable element. The presence of a fixed cost implies that the firm might not 
correct small deviations from the target as adjustment costs are likely to be higher 
than the benefit derived from rebalancing. A likely implication of a weakly convex 
variable cost is that the adjustment-cost curve is flatter than the curve of adjustment 
benefit.2 This implication makes intuitive sense, because otherwise adjustment costs 
that start with a fixed level and rise faster than the adjustment benefit would render 
rebalancing a value-destroying measure.3 Insofar as the adjustment costs increase at 
a slower rate than the costs of not adjusting, the net benefit from rebalancing widens 
with the size of deviation from the target capital structure. Consequently, the greater 
the deviation from target, the bigger the incentive to adjust and the higher the speed 
at which a firm adjusts. 
We confirm the existence of such a positive SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation 
in a large sample of U.S. industrial firms during 1966–2008. The estimated sensitivity 
is statistically and economically greater than zero, regardless of leverage measures 
and target leverage measures. The result is also robust to the Welch (2004) leverage 
adjustment model. In other words, the SOA is robustly and positively related to the 
distance from the target leverage. On average a one-standard-deviation increase in 
book leverage deviation is associated with an increase in the SOA by 0.104, which is 
large compared to the average SOA across all firms of about 0.12. 
The deviation dependency of SOA, when coupled with the asymmetric capital 
structure behavior (e.g., FFHS 2012), suggests that the SOA sensitivity to leverage 
deviation would depend on whether a firm’s current capital structure is below or above 
2 The literature suggests marginal bankruptcy costs are greater than marginal adjustment costs. For instance, 
Hennessy and Whited (2007) estimate that marginal equity floatation costs are 5.0% (10.7%) and marginal 
bankruptcy costs equal to 8.4% (15.1%) of capital for large (small) firms. In addition, although Andrade 
and Kaplan (1998) and Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) do not find conclusive evidence of bankruptcy costs 
having greater curvature than adjustment costs, they do not find evidence to the contrary either. 
3 It is highly conceivable that beyond some point above the target, the costs of adjustment exceed the 
benefit to be derived from adjustment. For example, an extremely overlevered firm might decide to go 
bankrupt rather than rebalance its capital structure as external capital becomes prohibitively costly. We 
will account for this situation later. 
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the target. To be more specific, as the cost of not adjusting increases at an increasing 
rate on the right-hand side of the target, the SOA for an overlevered firm is expected 
to rise faster than that of an underlevered firm. We present evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. 
We are the first to specifically examine cross-sectional heterogeneity in cap­
ital structure adjustment in terms of its relation with the leverage deviation. This 
relation per se is vital because the loss in firm value due to suboptimal capital 
structure is, by definition, intimately tied to the extent of deviation. This paper also 
features an innovative, bootstrapping-based method to estimate SOA. As discussed 
in Iliev and Welch (2011), existing estimators of the partial adjustment model fail 
to account for the boundedness of leverage ratio, which gives rise to mechanical 
mean reversion of leverage (Chen and Zhao, 2007; Chang and Dasgupta, 2009). 
To address this issue, we compare and interpret the SOA estimate in the real data 
against those in bootstrapped placebo samples, in which leverage ratios evolve by 
randomly drawn debt and equity changes and deliberate capital structure adjustments 
are missing. This way the difference between the real estimate and the placebo es­
timate depicts the effect of active adjustments on capital structure, net of estimation 
biases. 
2. Method and data 
In this section, we describe in detail our model that incorporates the potential 
heterogeneity in SOA, identify target leverage, and specify the bootstrapped-based 
estimation strategy. At the end, we discuss the data we use. 
2.1. Capital structure dynamic specification 
The canonical capital structure adjustment model holds that a firm that starts 
with a leverage ratio that is deviated from its target leverage will move to eliminate 
part or all of the deviation: 
∗ Li,t − Li,t−1 = λ(Li,t − Li,t−1) + εi,t , (1) 
where Li,t−1 and Li,t are the beginning and ending leverage of firm i in period t, 
and L ∗ is the target leverage. Hence L ∗ − Li,t−1 and Li,t − Li,t−1 represent the i,t i,t 
starting leverage deviation and the adjustment in leverage in period t. The coefficient 
of leverage deviation, λ, represents the fraction of the starting deviation that is 
eliminated during the period, and is the SOA. 
Our main hypothesis is that the SOA is positively related to the starting deviation 
because the benefit of adjustment increases faster than costs of adjustment as the 
deviation expands in most of the allowable range of leverage ratio. This is found 
in the prior literature on adjustment costs and bankruptcy costs as discussed in the 
introduction. However, the fact that firms in some cases choose to go bankrupt rather 
than rebalance indicates that adjustment costs may become prohibitively high as the 
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leverage ratio gets very close to 1. Therefore, we allow for heterogeneity in SOA 
along the starting deviation by expressing λ as a linear function of the deviation as 
well as an indicator of extremely high leverage in our baseline regression model: 
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (λ0 + λ1|L ∗ i,t − Li,t−1| + γ IH )(L ∗ i,t − Li,t−1) + εi,t , (2) 
where λ0 and λ1 are constants for all firms and years, and represent the common 
element of SOA and the SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation, respectively. IH is an 
indicator equal to 1 if the beginning leverage, Li,t−1, is greater than 0.9, and we expect 
its coefficient, γ , to be negative. While this indicator variable controls for the extreme 
high leverage case, we are mainly interested in how the SOA varies with leverage 
deviation, that is, λ1. If the SOA increases, as we expect, with the deviation, then λ1 
is significantly positive. If both λ1and γ are zero, then Equation (2) degenerates to 
the standard partial adjustment Equation (1). 
Following the literature, including Kayhan and Titman (2007), Lockhart (2010), 
and FFHS (2012), we adopt a two-step procedure to estimate Equations (1) and (2). In 
the first step, we estimate the target leverage, L ∗ , as the predicted value of leverage i,t
ratio in the following capital structure determination model: 
Li,t = βXi,t−1 + εi,t , (3) 
where, Xi,t−1 represents a set of time-varying firm and industry characteristics that are 
predetermined. The set of characteristics are not always the same across studies (e.g., 
Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008; Frank and Goyal, 
2009). In our baseline estimation, we mimic Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) and 
consider the following determinants: log of assets, market-to-book ratio, profitability, 
asset tangibility, cash flow volatility, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm 
pays a dividend or not, and the industry median leverage ratio. These variables are 
defined in Table 1. Considering the definition of leverage ratio bounds it between 0 
and 1, we estimate Equation (3) as a double-censored Tobit model. 
The second step is to substitute the target from Equation (3) into the adjustment 
Equations (1) and (2) and estimate the SOA, the SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation, 
and other parameters. We use a bootstrapping-based method as discussed in the next 
section. 
2.2. Bootstrapping-based estimation 
The literature provides at least four estimators for the capital structure adjustment 
model, including the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) (e.g., Kayhan and Titman, 
2007), the fixed effects estimator (Flannery and Rangan, 2006), the Blundell-Bond 
system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (e.g., Lemmon, Roberts 
and Zender, 2008), and the long-difference instrument variable estimator (Huang 
and Ritter, 2009). Out of these the system GMM estimator appears to perform the 
best (Flannery and Hankins, 2013). However, they do not address the mechanical 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Assets (at) Total assets (at) 
Debt (debt) The sum of long-term debt (dltt) and short-term debt (dlc) 
Liabilities (lt) Total liabilities (lt) 
Book equity (beq) Book equity, defined as max(seq, 0.01*debt, 0.001*assets) when seq is 
available, where seq is the stockholders’ equity 
Market equity (meq) Market equity, defined as seq − ceq + csho*prcc_f, where  seq is stockholders’ 
equity, ceq is common equity, csho is the number of shared outstanding, and 
prcc_f is the stock price at the end of the fiscal year 
Market debt-to-capital Baseline leverage measure, defined as debt/(debt + meq) 
ratio 
Book debt-to-capital Alternative leverage measure, defined as debt/(debt + beq) 
ratio 
Firm age Firm age 
Log assets The logarithm of (1+ at), where assets are in million dollars, adjusted to 2000 
levels using the gross domestic product deflator 
Market-to-book ratio Market value of total assets divided by book assets, defined as (meq + debt + 
pstkc − txditc)/at, where  pstkc is convertible preferred stock, and txditc is 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit. pstkc and txditc are set to zero if 
missing 
Profitability Defined as operating income before depreciation (oibdp)/assets (at) 
Asset tangibility Defined as net property, plant and equipment (ppent)/assets (at) 
Cash flow volatility Standard deviation of historic profitability (profit), requiring at least three 
years of data 
Dividend payer Indicator variable, equal to 1 if dividend is paid in the fiscal year 
indicator 
Industry median The median leverage ratio across all firms in the two-digit SIC industry in a 
leverage year 
Stock return (rt ) Stock return without dividends during the fiscal year 
Welch (2004) implied The market debt-to-capital ratio that comes about if a firm issues neither debt 
debt ratio (LW i,t ) nor equity, defined as Debtt−1/(Debtt−1 + meqt−1 · (1 + rt )) 
Leverage target The leverage ratio predicted by firm characteristics and industry median in the 
previous year. The prediction model is 
Li,t = βXi,t−1 + εi,t , 
where X is a vector of firm characteristics (log assets, market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, asset tangibility, cash flow volatility, dividend payer indicator) 
and industry median leverage. The model is treated as a double-censored Tobit 
model with an upper limit of 1 and a lower limit of 0, and estimated in a year­
by-year manner to avoid the look-ahead bias 
mean reversion issue of leverage ratio.4 The issue, as discussed in Chen and Zhao 
(2007), Chang and Dasgupta (2009), and Iliev and Welch (2011), is caused by the 
4 Contemporaneous to our paper, Elsas and Florysiak (2011) propose a fractional dependent variable 
estimator to address this issue. Our method provides an alternative. 
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boundedness of leverage ratio between zero and one.5 The above estimators do not 
account for this propensity and potentially give exaggerated SOAs. 
We propose a bootstrapping-based estimation approach that removes the effect 
of mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratio. First, we estimate the leverage 
adjustment models in our real sample using OLS to obtain biased estimates of, 
among others, the SOA and the SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation. The biases 
include the bias of the OLS estimator in the dynamic panel model (Hsiao, 2003) as 
well as that due to mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratio. Then we follow the 
data-generating process in Iliev and Welch (2011) to create “placebo” samples, in 
which leverage ratios evolve with randomly drawn debt and equity percent changes, 
so as to learn what estimates might be obtained under the null hypothesis of no 
managerial intervention. In the absence of deliberate adjustments, the estimates in 
these placebo samples reflect only estimation biases. To the extent that our estimates, 
both in the real data and in the placebo samples, are subject to the same set of 
biases, their differences give us the unbiased estimates of SOA and SOA sensitivity 
to leverage deviation.6 
In practice, for each regression, we bootstrap 250 placebo samples and their 
estimates constitute the null distribution of parameters in our adjustment models, 
which makes statistical inferences possible. The bootstrapping procedure is de­
scribed in the Appendix. The evolution of debt and equity under our placebo data-
generating process is independent of the firm’s own characteristics; hence, resulting 
estimates of SOA and SOA sensitivity are free from any conscious efforts of the firm’s 
manager. 
2.3. Data and variables 
We extract financial data from the annual Compustat database for all but financial 
(Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] 6000–6999) and utility (SIC 4900–4999) 
firms listed on NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ for the 1965–2008 period. The data 
exclude firm years with missing data for book assets, assets lower than $1 million in 
2000 U.S. dollars, or missing information in both Compustat and CRSP for computing 
the year-end market equity. We require that each firm in our sample has at least two 
5 In particular, Chang and Dasgupta (2009) show via Monte Carlo simulations that even when firms follow 
random financing, the partial adjustment model will yield a positive SOA, a result that is a mechanical by-
product devoid of any theoretical basis. An intuitive explanation for this outcome is that, the nonlinearity 
of the leverage ratio makes it more difficult to further raise (lower) a leverage ratio than to lower (raise) it 
given an already high (low) leverage. Consequently, leverage ratio exhibits a “mechanical” propensity to 
revert to intermediate levels. 
6 A caveat is in order: it is difficult to show analytically that the estimation biases are identical for the 
real and placebo samples. However, in untabulated results, we show that three existing estimators, that is, 
pooled OLS, fixed effects, and system GMM, which give widely diverse SOA estimates in the conventional 
partial adjustment model, yield similar “net” SOA estimates after the placebo SOA is deducted. This is 
consistent with estimation biases of these estimators being correctly removed. 
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consecutive years of observations, given our interest in the leverage adjustment. Our 
data-filtering process follows the typical method in the literature, and the final sample 
includes 115,299 firm-year observations for 9,314 firms, which, on average, is 12.4 
years per firm. 
We use both the book and market debt-to-capital ratios to measure financial 
leverage, the former defined as total debt (short-term and long-term debt) divided by 
total book capital, that is, the sum of total debt and book equity, and the latter defined 
as total debt divided by the sum of market equity and debt. To avoid unreasonable 
leverage ratios, we winsorize the book equity at the bottom as the highest out of 
the book equity, 1% of total debt and 0.1% of total assets. Most firm characteristics, 
including firm size, market-to-book ratio, profitability, asset tangibility and cash flow 
volatility, are winsorized at the top and bottom one-percentiles to mitigate the effect 
of outliers and eradicate errors in the data. 
3. Results 
3.1. Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the statistical summary for our sample. Leverage is measured 
by both the book and market debt-to-capital ratios. The book leverage ratio averages 
0.308 with a median of 0.286 and a standard deviation of 0.251. The market leverage 
ratio has a lower mean of 0.240, consistent with the market-to-book ratio being greater 
than 1 in both mean and median. The estimated target leverage ratios have similar 
means to the actual debt ratios but smaller variances. Leverage deviation is calculated 
as the difference between the target leverage and the actual leverage, and its mean 
and median are close to zero for both book and market debt-to-capital ratios. Industry 
median leverage is the median leverage ratio across all firms in the same two-digit 
SIC industry in the year, and its lag value is used together with firm characteristics 
to predict target leverage. 
An average firm in our sample has $1,963 million in assets. Its market-to-book 
ratio is 1.54, its operating income before depreciation accounts for 10.3% of its assets 
(profitability), 31.6% of assets are tangible, and its cash flow volatility is 9.3%. Forty-
six percent of the firms pay dividends. These statistics are very similar to those found 
in other studies in this area (e.g., Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008). 
3.2. Homogeneous SOA estimates using bootstrapping-based method 
Using the bootstrapping approach described above, we first estimate the SOA 
based on the assumption that it is the same for all the firms and all years. In other 
words, we estimate Equation (2) in both the real sample, and in the 250 bootstrapped 
placebo samples and then compare the estimated real coefficient, λ, against the mean 
placebo coefficient. The purpose is to provide a basic SOA estimate from which 
heterogeneous SOA will be developed later. The results are reported in Table 3. 
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Table 2 
Statistic summary 
Our final sample includes 115,299 firm-year observations during 1966–2008 for 9,314 nonfinancial, 
nonutility firms listed on NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ exchanges. We require a firm has assets of at 
least 1 million unadjusted U.S. dollars and at least two consecutive years of financial data available from 
Compustat. Nonadjacent fiscal years of a same GVKEY are treated as separate firms. This table provides 
summary statistics for leverage measures, target leverage ratios, initial deviation from targets, historic 
industry median leverage, and firm characteristics. Leverage is measured by book and market debt-to­
capital ratios. Leverage targets are estimated in a regression based on firm and industry characteristics as 
described in Table 1. Historic industry median leverage is the historic median leverage ratio of firms in the 
same two-digit SIC industry. Firm characteristics include total assets in year 2000 dollar, adjusted using 
the gross domestic product deflator, firm age, market-to-book ratio, profitability measured as operating 
income before depreciation and amortization divided by assets, asset tangibility as fixed assets divided by 
total assets, cash flow volatility measured as the standard deviation of profitability, and whether the firm 
pays dividends in the fiscal year (dividend payer indicator). 
Variable Mean Median Std Dev 10th pctl 90th pctl 
Leverage 
Book debt-to-capital ratio 0.308 0.286 0.251 0 0.649 
Market debt-to-capital ratio 0.240 0.181 0.229 0 0.587 
Target book leverage 0.292 0.297 0.141 0.095 0.470 
Target market leverage 0.232 0.231 0.145 0.027 0.413 
Deviation from target book leverage 0.011 −0.015 0.216 −0.232 0.288 
Deviation from target market leverage 0.001 −0.016 0.178 −0.194 0.238 
Industry median book leverage 0.274 0.281 0.138 0.090 0.450 
Industry median market leverage 0.193 0.176 0.140 0.030 0.379 
Firm characteristics 
Assets ($m) 1,963.4 147.7 11684.5 15.7 2,788.2 
Market-to-book ratio 1.54 1.06 1.45 0.54 3.01 
Profitability 0.103 0.131 0.209 −0.036 0.248 
Asset tangibility 0.316 0.266 0.225 0.061 0.667 
Cash flow volatility 0.093 0.059 0.135 0.021 0.183 
Dividend payer indicator 0.463 0 0.499 0 1 
The SOA estimate in the real data for both book and market leverage are in 
column 2, and the means and standard deviations of SOA across the placebo sam­
ples are in columns 3 and 4. For book leverage, the real sample estimate is 0.164, 
consistent with existing OLS estimates in the literature. The SOA estimates in the 
bootstrapped placebo samples have a mean of 0.045 and a small standard deviation of 
0.001. The average placebo SOA is significantly greater than zero, justifying the ne­
cessity of removing estimation biases using the bootstrapping-based approach. Note 
that the spurious SOA in the placebo samples where deliberate targeting is missing 
reflects the combined effect of the bias of OLS estimator in our dynamic panel context 
and the mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratio. Given that the OLS estimate of 
SOA is known to be downwardly biased (e.g., Huang and Ritter, 2009), the spurious 
SOA caused by the mechanical mean reversion should be greater than 0.045. 
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Table 3 
Homogeneous speed of adjustment (SOA) toward target leverage 
This table shows model estimates in both the real data and the bootstrapped placebo data of the homoge­
neous SOA model below: 
∗ Li,t − Li,t−1 = λ(Li,t − Li,t−1) + εi,t , 
where Li,t is measured by the market and book debt-to-capital ratios, Li,t is the regression-based target 
leverage, and the coefficient, λ, measures the average capital structure SOA. The placebo samples are 
generated by bootstrapping random debt and equity issuance to update leverage and deliberate managerial 
interventions are missing. The estimated coefficients in the real data are in column 2. The mean and 
standard deviation of the coefficient in the 250 placebo samples are in columns 3 and 4, respectively. 
Column 5 displays the difference between the real coefficient and the mean null coefficient, which is 
our estimate of SOA after removing the effect of mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratio. Column 6 
shows the implied half-life of leverage deviation given the estimated SOA. 
λ 
Half-life 
Leverage Real Placebo σP lacebo Real – placebo (years) 
Book leverage 0.164 0.045** 0.001 0.120** 5.5 
Market leverage 0.195 0.054** 0.001 0.141** 4.6 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively, evaluated against the placebo 
distribution of SOA. 
The difference between real and placebo estimates (column 5), which shows the 
true SOA free of estimation biases, is 0.120 for book leverage, falling, not surprisingly, 
into the lower end of the range in prior estimates in the literature (0.07–0.36). This 
finding says firms on average eliminate 12% of their leverage deviations each year, 
corresponding to a half-life of 5.5 years.7 The market debt-to-capital ratio exhibits 
similar results. The placebo SOA estimates average 0.054 and the “net” SOA is 0.141, 
corresponding to a half-life of 4.6 years. 
3.3. Heterogeneous SOAs that depend on leverage deviation 
3.3.1. Initial deviation and subsequent adjustment of leverage 
Figure 1 depicts a graphical look at the relation between the starting devia­
tion from target leverage and the subsequent change in capital structure. For either 
leverage measure, we partition the sample into equal-sized quintiles based on the 
leverage deviation at the beginning of a fiscal year and then compute the change 
in the average leverage ratio for each quintile in the year. Two lines are drawn to 
show the leverage change in the original real sample and in the 250 placebo sam­
ples, respectively. Firms increase their leverage when underlevered (small deviation 
7 The half-life is calculated as ln(0.5)/ln(1−SOA). 
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Figure 1 
Deviation and subsequent change in leverage 
The figure shows the average initial leverage deviation from the target and the change in leverage in the 
subsequent fiscal year of U.S. industrial firms during 1966–2008. Leverage is measured by book and 
market debt-to-capital ratios, and the target is estimated as a linear function of firm characteristics and 
industry median leverage in the previous year. 
in Quintile 1 and Quintile 2) and decrease it when overlevered (large deviation in 
Quintile 4 and Quintile 5), and the adjustment is greater as leverage deviation is 
greater. This adjustment appears real because bootstrapped firms exhibit a similar 
but much weaker pattern. The figure, however, fails to give us the comparison of the 
adjustment speeds to which now we turn. 
3.3.2. Does SOA depend on leverage deviation? 
Our alternative hypothesis is that a firm’s SOA in a given year is positively 
related to its starting deviation from the target, because larger deviation normally 
means larger benefit of rebalancing the leverage. To test it, we estimate Equation (3) 
and report the coefficients, λ0, λ1, and γ , in Table 4. If λ1 is significantly greater than 
zero, then the null hypothesis of homogeneous SOA is rejected, with the conclusion 
being that SOA is positively related to starting leverage deviation. 
The estimates in the real sample, the mean and standard deviations of esti­
mates in the 250 placebo samples, the difference between the real estimates and the 
mean placebo estimates, and the implied economic effect are reported in columns 3 
through 7, respectively. We are most interested in λ1, which measures the SOA sen­
sitivity to leverage deviation. In the real data, λ0 is merely 0.032 (compared to the 
homogenous SOA estimate of 0.164) while λ1 is 0.498 for book leverage, implying 
that the book leverage SOA is largely variable and determined mainly by the leverage 
deviation. The placebo λ1 is 0.019, not significantly different from zero, implying 
that it does not depend on leverage deviation in the placebo samples. The difference 
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Table 4 
Speed of adjustment (SOA) and leverage deviation 
This table shows model estimates in both the real data and the bootstrapped placebo data of the heteroge­
neous SOA model below: 
∗ ∗ Li,t = Li,t−1 + (λ0 + λ1|L − Li,t−1| + γ IH )(L − Li,t−1) + εi,t ,i,t i,t 
where Li,t is measured by the market and book debt-to-capital ratios, L ∗ is the regression-based target i,t 
leverage, and IH is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if is greater than 0.9. The placebo samples are 
generated by bootstrapping random debt and equity issuance to update leverage without allowing for 
deliberate managerial interventions. The estimated coefficients in the real data are in column 3. The means 
and standard deviations of the coefficients in the 250 placebo samples are in columns 4 and 5, respec­
tively. Column 6 displays the difference between the real coefficients and the mean placebo coefficients. 
Column 7 shows the implied difference in leverage adjustment between two firms whose initial leverage 
deviations are one-standard-deviation away from each other. The standard deviation of leverage deviation 
is 0.216 for book debt-to-capital ratio and 0.178 for market debt-to-capital ratio. 
Leverage Parameter Real Placebo σP lacebo Real – placebo Implied effect 
Book leverage	 λ0 0.032 0.033** 0.011 −0.001 
λ1 0.498 0.019 0.011 0.479** 0.104 
γ −0.414 −0.002 0.008 −0.412** 
Market leverage	 λ0 0.155 0.031* 0.016 0.124** 
λ1 0.201 0.036* 0.018 0.165** 0.029 
γ −0.377 −0.088** 0.014 −0.289** 
(1)	 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively, evaluated against the placebo 
distributions. 
between the two estimates gives us the unbiased estimate of SOA sensitivity to 
leverage deviation, 0.479, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. If firm 
X’s leverage departure8 is 10% higher than that of firm Y, then X’s SOA would be 
faster than Y’s by about 0.048. This difference is large compared to the average SOA 
estimate of 0.120. 
To better gauge the economic significance of our results, we calculate the differ­
ence in the SOA between two firms of which the initial leverage departures differ by 
one standard deviation, as shown in column 7. The “net” λ1 is 0.479, and the standard 
deviation of the initial leverage departure from target is 0.216 (Table 2), and their 
product is 0.104, or 10.4%. Now assume two firms, A and B, both of which have 
the target book debt-to-capital ratio of 30%, and firm A is overlevered with a debt 
ratio of, say, 40%, while firm B’s debt ratio is one-standard-deviation higher, that 
is, 0.616. Then firm A would shed 4.7% (= −0.001 + 0.479*10%) of the starting 
departure in the first year and firm B would trim down its leverage ratio by 15% 
(= −0.001 + 0.479*0.316). The implied SOAs allow us to make two more direct 
8 Hereafter we use “leverage departure” in place of “leverage deviation,” where necessary, to avoid such 
expressions as “the standard deviation of leverage deviation.” 
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comparisons. First, firm A lowers its leverage ratio by 4.7%*10% = 0.5 percentage 
point, while firm B lowers its ratio by 15%*31.6% = 4.7 percentage points. Second, 
the half-life of the leverage deviation is about 20 years for firm A in contrast to merely 
5.9 years for firm B.9 
Employing market leverage yields somewhat different results, but the main 
finding that SOA is positively related to starting leverage deviation remains. The “net” 
λ0 is 0.124, representing a statistically significant fixed component of SOA. The “net” 
λ1 is 0.165, implying a difference in leverage adjustment of 2.9 percentage points 
between two firms whose leverage departures are one-standard-deviation (0.178) 
away from each other. The third parameter, γ , has significantly negative estimates 
for both book and market leverage, consistent with firms with extremely high leverage 
finding adjustment costs prohibitively high and opting to go under. 
These findings are consistent with our dynamic tradeoff theory-based hypothesis 
that, as leverage deviation gets larger, the slope of the bankruptcy costs gets steeper 
relative to that of the tax shield, entailing greater benefits from rebalancing. This 
finding also permits us to draw an inference regarding the shape of adjustment costs. 
The positive dependency of SOA on starting deviation is possible only when the 
marginal adjustment costs increase at a slower rate than the marginal bankruptcy 
costs. These findings point to a fixed plus weakly convex variable adjustment-cost 
regime, consistent with Leary and Roberts (2005).10 
3.4. Asymmetric SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation 
Myers (1984) postulates that firm managers are likely to be more concerned 
about excessive leverage than inadequate leverage for at least two reasons. First, 
the opportunity cost of the lost tax shield stemming from underuse of leverage 
might be offset (at least partially) by benefits from reserve debt capacity that might 
be used to exploit future opportunities. Second, the firm’s ultimate cost of being 
overlevered is the total loss of value of its shares, while the ultimate cost of being 
underlevered is the opportunity cost associated with the lost tax shield. Thus, the 
managers’ incentive to adjust in an overlevered situation is likely to be higher than 
when the firm is in an underlevered situation, implying a faster SOA when the firm 
is overlevered. Asymmetry in SOA per se can be viewed as a type of heterogeneity 
that firms with the identical extent of leverage deviation, yet of different signs, 
9 Because we assume the SOA is constant within any year but changes year to year, it is a step function of 
the leverage deviation from target, and there is not a convenient equation to solve for the half-life. Instead, 
we find the half-life case by case, taking into account the varying SOA. 
10 We conduct a series of robustness tests to confirm that our findings hold. The robustness tests in­
volve employing (1) alternative leverage measures, (2) alternative leverage target measures, (3) alter­
native bootstrapping strategies, (4) the Welch (2004) adjustment model, (5) alternative cutoffs for high 
leverage indicator, and we obtain the positive SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation under every scenario. 
The results are available at request. 
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Table 5 
Asymmetric speed of adjustment (SOA) 
This table shows estimates in both the real data and the bootstrapped placebo data of the capital structure 
adjustment model that allows for asymmetric SOA as below: 
∗	 ∗ Li,t = Li,t−1 + λUL(L − Li,t−1) · IL ∗ + λOL(L − Li,t−1) · IL ∗ + εi,t ,i,t i,t >Li,t−1 i,t i,t ≤Li,t−1 
where Li,t is measured by book and market debt-to-capital ratios, and L ∗ is the target leverage based on i,t 
a vector of firm and industry characteristics. Indicator variable IL ∗ is equal to 1 if L ∗ 
i,t 
>Li,t−1 i,t > Li,t−1; 
indicator variable IL ∗ is equal to 1 if L ∗ ≤ Li,t−1. The estimated coefficients in the real data are 
i,t 
≤Li,t−1 i,t 
in column 4. The means and standard deviations of the coefficients in the 250 null samples are in columns 
5 and 6, respectively. Column 7 displays the difference between the real coefficients and the mean placebo 
coefficients. Column 8 presents the implied half-lives of leverage deviation in the real data and the placebo 
data as well as their difference. 
Leverage Subsample Parameter Real Placebo σP lacebo Real – placebo Half-life (years) 
Book leverage	 Underlevered λUL  0.157 0.057** 0.002 0.100** 6.6 
Overlevered λOL 0.177 0.021** 0.001 0.156** 4.1 
Difference −0.056** 2.5 
Market leverage	 Underlevered λUL  0.198 0.067** 0.004 0.131** 4.9 
Overlevered λOL 0.215 0.038** 0.001 0.177** 3.6 
Difference −0.046** 1.4 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 
adjust at different rates. Empirically, there is scattered documentation of asymmetric 
capital structure behavior. For instance, Chen and Zhao (2007) show that financing 
decisions supporting the targeting theory primarily come from highly levered firms 
that cut debt. Leary and Roberts (2005) find firms’ propensity of rebalancing given 
a high or lifted leverage is greater than that given a low or reduced leverage. Byoun 
(2008), Lockhart (2010) and FFHS (2012) provide direct evidence that the SOA is 
greater for overlevered firms. However, it is not clear whether the evidence holds after 
eliminating mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratio. We use the following model 
to estimate the different SOAs in the underlevered and overlevered subsamples: 
Li,t = Li,t−1 + λUL(L ∗ − Li,t−1) · IL ∗	 (4)i,t i,t >Li,t−1 
∗ + λOL(L − Li,t−1) · IL ∗ + εi,t ,i,t i,t ≤Li,t−1 
where, IL ∗ and IL ∗ are indicator variables that take on a value of 1 for i,t ≤Li,t−1 >Li,t−1i,t 
underlevered and overlevered firms, respectively. If SOA is asymmetric, we expect 
the overlevered subsample to have higher SOA than the underlevered subsample, that 
is, λOL > λUL. The model is estimated using our bootstrapping-based approach. 
Table 5 presents the estimated SOA for underlevered and overlevered firms in 
the real data, reported in column 4, as well as the mean and standard deviation of 
SOA in the 250 bootstrapped placebo samples, in columns 5 and 6. The real data 
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SOA is greater for overlevered firms, and the placebo SOA is statistically positive 
in both subsamples. Again we are most interested in their difference between the 
real data estimate and the placebo estimate that reflects the “net” SOA that is free of 
mechanical mean reversion. This result is reported in column 7. For both book and 
market leverage, we do find a greater SOA for overlevered firms. For example, SOA 
is 0.156 for overlevered firms, corresponding to a half-life 0f 4.1 years, but is only 
0.100 for underlevered firms, corresponding to a half-life of 6.6 years. The difference 
in SOA is economically significant. 
The asymmetry in average SOA, coupled with deviation-dependent heterogene­
ity, suggests yet another asymmetry—the SOA sensitivity to deviation. For a same 
deviation from target, a firm would employ a greater SOA when the deviation is above 
rather than below the target. This implies that the SOA increases faster as deviation 
expands in the overlevered domain. In other words, when a firm further deviates from 
the target leverage from above, the manager will feel faster accumulating pressure 
to undo the deviation than when the same deviation occurs from below. The finding 
of asymmetric SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation would corroborate our earlier 
findings of the positive association between SOA and starting leverage deviation. 
The specification of our asymmetrically heterogeneous SOA model is 
Li,t = Li,t−1 + (λ0 + λ+ 1 |L ∗ − Li,t−1| + γ IH )(L ∗ − Li,t−1) · IL ∗ i,t ≤Li,t−1i,t i,t − (5)+ (λ0 + λ1 |L ∗ − Li,t−1|)(L ∗ − Li,t−1) · IL ∗ >Li,t−1 + εi,t ,i,t i,t i,t 
where IL ∗ and IL ∗ are indicators for overlevered and underlevered firms, i,t ≤Li,t−1 >Li,t−1i,t 
respectively. We use the plus and minus superscripts to differentiate the coefficients 
for overlevered firms and underlevered firms. The potential asymmetry in SOA 
sensitivity to leverage deviation would be reflected in the difference between the 
−two sensitivity parameters, that is, λ+ 1 and λ1 . Note that in our bootstrapped-based 
estimation, the true heterogeneity effect involves a comparison between estimated 
coefficients in the real data and the placebo data, hence examination of asymmetry 
in SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation can be viewed as a difference-in-difference 
test. 
Estimation results are in Table 6. The positive relation between SOA and leverage 
deviation remains in both the overlevered subsample and the underlevered one as the 
−
“net” sensitivity estimates, λ+ and λ1 , are all significantly positive. For instance, as 1 
book leverage is employed, the SOA sensitivity to leverage deviation is 0.523 among 
overlevered firms and 0.428 among underlevered ones. The comparison between 
these two sensitivity estimates is shown in the last row of column 7 for either 
leverage measure as the difference (between overlevered firms and underlevered 
firms) in difference (between real and placebo estimates). The metric is 0.095 for 
book leverage, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. A quick gauge 
shows that, a one-standard-deviation increase in leverage departure above the target 
would enhance the SOA by 9.2 percentage points, while the effect of a one-standard­
deviation increase in leverage departure below the target is 4.4 percentage points, 
differing by 4.8 percentage points. We witness weaker but qualitative similar results 
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Table 6 
Asymmetric speed of adjustment (SOA) sensitivity to leverage deviation 
This table shows estimates in both the real data and the bootstrapped placebo data of the heterogeneous 
SOA model that allows for asymmetric speed of adjustment as below: 
+ +Li,t = Li,t−1 + (λ + λ1 |L ∗ − Li,t−1| + γ IH )(L ∗ − Li,t−1) · IL ∗ 0 i,t i,t i,t ≤Li,t−1 − −+ (λ + λ1 |L ∗ − Li,t−1|)(L ∗ − Li,t−1) · IL ∗ + εi,t ,0 i,t i,t i,t >Li,t−1 
where Li,t is measured by book and market debt-to-capital ratios, and L ∗ is the target leverage based on i,t 
a vector of firm and industry characteristics. Indicator variable IL ∗ is equal to 1 if L ∗ > Li,t−1; 
i,t 
>Li,t−1 i,t 
IL ∗ is equal to 1 if L ∗ ≤ Li,t−1. The estimated coefficients in the real data are in column 3. 
i,t 
≤Li,t−1 i,t 
The means and standard deviations of the coefficients in the 250 null samples are in columns 4 and 
5, respectively. Column 6 displays the differences between the real coefficients and the mean placebo 
coefficients. Column 7 presents the implied difference in leverage adjustment between two underlevered 
(or overlevered) firms whose leverage deviation is one-standard-deviation away from each other, as well 
as the difference in difference of leverage adjustment between underlevered and overlevered firms. The 
standard deviation of positive and negative leverage deviations are 0.175 and 0.103 respectively for book 
leverage, and 0.144 and 0.090 respectively for market leverage. 
Leverage Parameter Real Placebo σP lacebo Real – placebo Implied effect 
Book leverage λ0 
λ+ 1 
λ− 1 
γ 
0.046 
0.530 
0.371 
−0.478 
0.043** 
0.007 
−0.057 
−0.002 
0.005 
0.008 
0.045 
0.009 
0.003** 
0.523** 
0.428** 
−0.476** 
0.092 
0.044 
Market leverage 
λ+ 1 − λ− 1 
λ0 
λ+ 1 
λ− 1 
γ 
0.159 
0.165 
0.207 
0.091 
−0.418 
0.064 
0.029** 
0.039** 
0.049 
−0.111** 
0.042 
0.009 
0.009 
0.058 
0.016 
0.095* 
0.137** 
0.168** 
0.043** 
−0.307** 
0.048 
0.024 
0.004 
λ+ 1 − λ− 1 0.116 −0.009 0.059 0.125* 0.020 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. 
when market debt-to-capital ratio is the measure of leverage. Therefore, the findings 
support our hypothesis that overlevered firms exhibit greater sensitivity to increasing 
deviation from their target capital structure. 
4. Conclusions 
The link between starting leverage deviation and the SOA is vital because the 
loss in firm value due to suboptimal capital structure is, by definition, intimately tied 
to the extent of deviation. Based on the cost–benefit analysis of the use of debt, we 
postulate that the SOA of capital structure is positively associated with the starting 
leverage deviation. The hypothesis hinges primarily on the difference in rates at which 
bankruptcy costs and tax shield of debt change as a firm moves away from its target 
leverage. Without loss of generality, the marginal tax shield is a decreasing function 
while the marginal bankruptcy cost is an increasing function of the leverage. The net 
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benefit of rebalancing (or the loss in firm value due to not rebalancing) expands at 
an increasing rate as the leverage moves farther away from the target. Consequently, 
a firm’s incentive to rebalance its capital structure increases. This benefit must be 
balanced against the cost of readjustment. What continues to make the leverage 
deviation relevant to capital structure rebalancing is that the slope of the net adjustment 
benefit curve gets steeper relative to the cost of adjustment curve as the leverage 
deviation increases, providing inducement to the firm to employ a higher SOA. 
We examine this hypothesis in a large sample of U.S. industrial firms during 
1966–2008 and demonstrate that the SOA is positively related to the distance from 
the target leverage. Indeed, on average a one-standard-deviation difference in initial 
leverage departure could lead to a difference of 10.4 percentage points in the SOA, 
which is very large because the average SOA across all firms is about 12%. The results 
are robust regardless of leverage measures, target measures, bootstrapping strategies, 
and leverage adjustment models. We also demonstrate that the adjustment behavior 
is asymmetric in that a firm exhibits a greater sensitivity to leverage deviations when 
it is above rather than below its target capital structure. 
A useful by-product of this paper is a bootstrapping-based estimation approach 
to address the mechanical mean reversion of leverage ratio. We bootstrap random 
debt and equity changes to create placebo samples where managerial interventions 
are missing, then estimate the leverage adjustment model in the real sample as well 
as placebo samples, and interpret the real estimate against the distribution of the 
placebo estimate. The difference between the real estimate and placebo estimate then 
represents the pure effect of active adjustment of capital structure, net of estimation 
bias caused by mechanical mean reversion. This approach can be modified to deal 
with situations requiring similar expositions. 
Appendix: Creating placebo samples using bootstrapping 
The placebo jointly models random debt and equity changes. The procedure 
works as follows:  
(1) For each firm year, we draw another random firm year from the sample. This 
draw is selected without regard to any characteristics of the firm or the draw. 
(2) We compute the percent change in equity and the percent change in debt of 
the random draw. 
(3) We use the percent change in debt and the percent change in equity from 
the draw to compute a random evolution for the original firm’s leverage as 
below: 
Di,t Di,t−1 · (1 + νj,t−1,t )
Li,t = = , (A1)
Di,t + Ei,t Di,t−1 · (1 + νj,t−1,t ) + Ei,t−1 · (1 + ηj,t−1,t ) 
where Di,t , Di,t−1, Ei,t , Ei,t−1 are the original firm’s debt and equity at time t − 1, and 
debt and equity at time t, respectively; is the fractional change in equity from t − 1 to  
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t, and νj,t−1,t is the fractional change in debt from t − 1 to  t, of the random draw 
firm. 
Theoretically, ηj,t−1,t and νj,t−1,t can be as low as −1 and as high as ∞; they are  
winsorized at −0.8 on the down side and 5 on the up side to avoid frequent extreme 
moves. To illustrate the data-generating process, let us assume that a sample firm 
starts out with $50 in debt and $50 in equity for a leverage ratio of 50%. We select a 
random firm-year draw. Say that this firm-year draw happens to show an increase in 
its debt from $10 to $30 and an increase in its equity from $40 to $60. Applying the 
200% change in debt and the 50% change in equity, a random evolution moves the 
original sample firm from its 50% leverage ratio to a $150/[$150 + $75] ≈ 66.7% 
leverage ratio. Our procedure preserves all the essential characteristics of a bounded 
ratio. The following year, this firm’s 66.7% leverage ratio is adjusted by another 
random firm-year draw. 
The evolution of debt and equity under this process is independent of the firm’s 
own characteristics. With so few assumptions about how debt and equity evolve, our 
process is a conservative placebo in the sense that a model of deliberate managerial 
intervention should find it easy to reject the notion that real-world debt ratios behave 
just like such placebo evolutions. Any statistic obtained from data sets so simulated 
should not be attributed to the deliberate actions of managers based on the firm’s own 
characteristics, in particular, leverage deviation. 
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